THE NATIONAL INTEREST

President Donald Trump greets President Lee Jae-myung of the Republic of Korea, Monday, August 25, 2025, at the West Wing entrance of the White House.(Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok)

Topic: Diplomacy Blog Brand: Korea Watch Region: Asia
Tags: China, Japan, Kim Jong-un, Korean Peninsula, Lee Jae-myung, North Korea, Northeast Asia, Russia, Sanae Takaichi, South Korea, and Yoon Suk-yeol

How to Think About Lee Jae-myung's Foreign Policy

June 24, 2026 | By: Paul J. Saunders, and Moon Chung-in

SHARE:

While President Lee Jae-myung has corrected the excesses of his predecessor's foreign policy, he has not steered South Korea in a pro-China, anti-US direction.

Editor's Note: Center for the National Interest President and The National Interest Publisher Paul Saunders talked with Professor Moon Chung-in on June 16 to discuss the current trajectory and thinking behind South Korean foreign policy under President Lee Jae-myung. A distinguished scholar, Professor Moon is the James Laney professor emeritus at Yonsei University. He previously served as the chairman of the Sejong Institute and as a special advisor to President MoCon Jae-in on unification, diplomacy, and national security affairs, among many other posts in his long and impressive career. The following transcript of the interview has been edited for style and clarity. Read the first interview with Professor

Moon here.

Paul Saunders (PS): Thank you very much for your willingness to talk again. In our first conversation, we focused on the Korean government's vision for its relationship with North Korea. Today, we'll have a somewhat broader conversation about President Lee Jae-myung's foreign policy objectives. As a departure point, Lee Jae-myung has been the president of the Republic of Korea for more than a year. How would you describe the differences between the approach that he's taking versus the foreign policy of his predecessor, President Yoon Suk-yeol? And, in particular, I've often seen President Lee use the phrase "pragmatic diplomacy." What does he mean by that?

Moon Chung-in (MC): It's a big question. Former President Yoon Suk-yeol emphasized the importance of universal values. He even volunteered to be a crusader for the spread of liberal internationalism. He was pursuing a values-based foreign policy; to some extent, I would apply the term "Cold War liberalism" to him, in which "force-to-force," "peace through strength," and the spread of freedom were guiding principles, especially in dealing with North Korea.

Former President Yoon also saw the world in Manichean terms; North Korea is a communist, evil regime. And South Korea is a democratic country. We have freedom. North Korea does not have freedom. Therefore, North Korea is an entity to be crushed.

He also argued that North Korea poses an existential threat to South Korea. It is more so because of its nuclear weapons and ballistic and cruise missiles. We should be ready for that. His advocacy for the preemption doctrine—the "left of launch" involving "kill chain" capability emerged from this context. South Korea should strike the North preemptively before it launches massive missile attacks.

The American alliance was the ultimate asset for President Yoon. He put everything in the American basket. He also tended to treat those who were critical of his foreign policy and his policy on North Korea as anti-state forces. That is one of the reasons he attempted a palace coup in December 2023. I think he was, in a sense, a warrior of Cold War liberalism.

President Lee Jae-myung is the opposite. He emphasizes national interests over values and ideology. His most urgent task is to reduce tensions with North Korea, avoid an accidental military clash, and seek to transform the existing armistice regime into a peace regime. For him, preventive diplomacy is more important than winning a war against North Korea. He sees many negative consequences of using force. He is strongly opposed to the idea of using force unconditionally. He is prepared for North Korean provocations through strong national defense, but his priority is preventive diplomacy.

President Lee strongly appreciates the alliance with the United States, but he has argued that there is no reason to antagonize neighboring countries such as Japan and China.

Unlike his predecessor, Lee has been trying to listen to the views of diverse groups. It isn't that easy, because the conservative opposition has been very critical of his foreign and

national security policy. But to my understanding, he has been trying to communicate with them, even recruiting some conservative-tilt folks into the foreign policy-making circle. I can't say it's been effective, but I believe his attitude toward national consensus-building will eventually make a difference.

Finally, whereas President Yoon tended to delegate foreign policy issues to his immediate confidants, President Lee does not delegate. He lets the bureaucratic agencies compete with one another to develop multiple solutions, then he chooses and implements the best ones. He understands foreign policy and national security issues very well and wants to stand at the commanding heights. This is one of the big differences between Yoon and Lee.

PS: Thank you. Another big question for our American audience would be how President Lee views the US-Korea relationship. President Yoon was aligning very closely with the United States. I imagine he would argue that he was doing that based on both Korea's interests, as he saw them, and Korea's values. Some in the United States argue that President Lee and his supporters are very far to the left and that they're not interested in the United States or in the relationship with it. They don't want to support American priorities—like the Iran War. They suggest that President Lee and some people around him are basically anti-American, pro-Chinese, and pro-North Korean. I saw an opinion piece in *The Wall Street Journal* arguing that President Lee wants to rewrite the South Korean Constitution and keep his party in power indefinitely.
How would you respond to this criticism of President Lee? In your first answer, you made a clear statement that he's trying to balance South Korea's relationship with the United States with the need to have the right kind of relationships with neighbors, including China and North Korea. Does that mean that Korea is anti-American or pro-Chinese?

MC: I think I skipped answering one of your earlier questions about the so-called pragmatic diplomacy of the Lee government. Let me briefly explain that one, then get back to this question. President Lee labels his foreign policy as a pragmatic diplomacy based on national interest. He operationalizes the concept of national interest in terms of ensuring survival (ie, the protection of citizens' lives and property), promoting prosperity, and enhancing national and human dignity.

In pursuing them, his pragmatic diplomacy employs three distinctive operational principles.

The **first** is the principle of "seeking truth from facts" and "problem-solving." For him, facts and interests are more important than values and ideology. Finding "problem-solving" alternatives through cold assessment of reality is the essence of his pragmatic approach. Departing from the traditional emphasis on "denuclearization first," he proposes a phased approach to the North Korean nuclear problem through freezing its nuclear and missile activities and reducing its nuclear and missile arsenal, while setting denuclearization as a long-term goal. That is a good example of his pragmatic approach.

The **second** principle is strategic empathy. Lee tries to understand his counterparts by putting himself in their shoes. His intersubjective understanding rejects the strategic narcissism that was particularly pronounced during the previous Yoon government. His 2025 National

Independence Day speech underscores this approach par excellence. He declared three principles on North Korea. First principle: we respect the North Korean regime as it is. Second: we don't intend to pursue unification by absorption. Third: we do not have any hostile intent or policy toward North Korea.

The **third** operational principle is national consensus-building. President Lee believes that foreign and national security policy can never be effective without domestic social and political support. To win domestic support, he needs to formulate foreign and national security policies based on national consensus. Given the nature of extreme political polarization in South Korea, it won't be easy for him to build national consensus. But he will try.

PS: Okay. Now we have the question about the charges that President Lee and his political allies are pro-China, pro-North Korea, and that they are trying to change the Constitution.

MC: Yes, I read a recent *The Wall Street Journal* op-ed by Nicholas Eberstadt and Lawrence Peck that made such charges. But I do not agree with their charges. Their arguments are not based on solid facts and are even biased. The Lee government is not anti-America, pro-North Korea, or pro-China. And I do not detect any trends toward illiberal democracy under the Lee government. Let me tell you why.

First, is Lee's government anti-American? I don't think so. President Lee has repeatedly said that the United States is the Republic of Korea's most important ally and that we should maintain a very strong alliance with the United States. If you look at his two meetings with President Donald Trump since his inauguration in June 2025, he accommodated most of America's demands.

Lee pledged to increase defense burden-sharing from the current level of 2.6 percent of GDP to 3.5 percent by 2035. Per President Trump's request, he agreed to cover $33 billion for defense cost-sharing related to American forces stationed in South Korea over the next 10 years.

President Trump and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth have been calling for South Korea to play a greater role in its own defense. Unlike other US allies and partners, President Lee said in effect, "Yes, we'll do it." South Korean forces will be the main fighting forces; American forces will be supporting forces. For that, he wants the prompt transfer of wartime operational control from an American commander to the ROK commander. Secretary Hegseth has been praising the ROK as a "model ally" for these reasons.

Yes, there are some divergent opinions between Seoul and Washington, particularly regarding the US strategic flexibility doctrine and a full South Korean military commitment in the event of a contingency in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. The Lee government has been hesitant to endorse the strategic flexibility doctrine, which would allow the United States to move American forces in and out of South Korea freely without prior notice or consultation, because it could undermine strategic stability and encourage North Korea's military adventurism.

The same can be said of contingencies in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Given the close military ties between China and the DPRK, existential threats from the North, and the volatile security dynamics, it would be very difficult for South Korea to extend its military support to both. Fear of entrapment trap factors in here.

Second, is the Lee government pro-North Korea? During the presidential election, Lee pledged to reduce tensions, rebuild confidence with North Korea, and work to create a system of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula. For him, the number one priority is avoiding war and preventing accidental military clashes. As the President of the Republic of Korea, he is obliged to pursue a policy that can change North Korea's mind so that North Korea and South Korea can move toward peaceful coexistence. They should not stigmatize him as "pro-North Korean" simply because he tries to pursue a policy of reconciliation and peaceful coexistence with the North.

Third, is the Lee government pro-China? This question seems misleading and distorted. I still remember meeting Dr. Henry Kissinger on May 1, 2018, at his New York office. I asked his advice on how South Korea should approach China. His advice was simple and straightforward: "Remember, China is big, near, and powerful. Why should you neglect or antagonize China?" I see Dr. Kissinger's realist wisdom in President Lee's policy on China. While maintaining the alliance with the US, he is seeking a strategic cooperative partnership with China. He will not neglect or antagonize China. You cannot call this a "pro-China" stance.

From time to time, the national interests of the United States and the ROK can diverge. They should try to reconcile the difference and narrow the gap. That is what an alliance is all about.

As for your last question—that President Lee wants to rewrite the Constitution to keep his party in power permanently—I refute this argument. Eberstadt and Peck seem to be ignorant of the ROK constitution. Some of President Lee's supporters have been saying there should be a constitutional amendment to allow a two-term, four-year presidency. Right now, South Korea has a single-term five-year presidency. Three factors will falsify their proposition. First, President Lee has never expressed his opinion on this proposition.

Second, Article 128 of the Constitution does not permit the incumbent president to run for reelection, even if the constitutional amendment for a two-term, four-year presidency is enacted. Finally, it will be extremely hard for the ruling party to attain a quorum for the amendment in the National Assembly. And protests from civil society will be formidable. So the accusation that Lee is attempting a permanent power grab is totally nonsensical.

PS: Thank you. Before we move on, I want to follow up just for a minute on the Korea-China relationship. For many in the United States, China is a defining challenge of American foreign policy today. There are many different points of view on how to address it. Regardless of US policy, the way our allies and others deal with China has become a major preoccupation, too. I'm wondering how you think President Lee would reconcile these two relationships: the alliance with the United States and South Korea's relationship with China, which has been a key economic relationship for Korea. There are also, of course, Korean security interests at

stake.

If I look at others around the world, Kazakhstan has been remarkably successful in balancing its relationships with its great-power partners, including China, Russia, and the United States. But it's done this in a way that would be difficult for Korea to copy, as Kazakhstan is not allied with any of these countries. Some other governments have really failed at finding this balance. Ukraine is a prime example of a case that went badly. Before 2014, Ukraine was looking to the West for security guarantees and looking to the East for economic help. It wasn't sustainable. How is President Lee going to maintain this balance? What would it look like?

MC: It's a very tough question. It depends on the nature of the China-US strategic rivalry. If they get into a real military confrontation, then South Korea will have very limited leverage. If China and the United States continue to pursue a mix of competition and cooperation, South Korea will find some niches in between. The most important variable will be the nature of the relationship between Beijing and Washington.

PS: I think all of us probably prefer for that relationship to stay in the cooperation-competition mix, rather than something worse than that. Certainly, President Trump seems to want that.

MC: The Biden administration pursued a three-Cs policy on China: cooperation on global issues, competition in trade and technology, and confrontation in geopolitics and values. But the problem was that when China and the United States became confrontational over the Taiwan issue—which China calls a core interest—the chance for cooperation diminished, and the competition turned into a contest. Having realized this problem, President Trump seems more cautious in dealing with China. His May visit to Beijing underscores it. He was not offensive to China's core interests, including Taiwan. This being the case, the Lee government will try to muddle through the rivalry between China and the United States through some sort of balancing diplomacy. But as I pointed out, balancing diplomacy will be contingent on the structural constraints of trilateral relations.

US government pressures, shifting supply chain dynamics, and broader shifts in China's investment climate have greatly influenced the nature and direction of trade and investment among China, the ROK, and the United States since 2024. China used to be the number one destination of South Korea's outward direct foreign investment. In 2023, however, the United States became the top destination ($27.9 billion), whereas China accounted for only $1.9 billion—more than 10 times the difference.

Although China remains the ROK's top trading partner ($272 billion in 2024), the United States is catching up ($196 billion in 2024). As ROK investment in the United States grows, trade volume is also likely to increase owing to newly established supply chain networks. And under Trump's tariff pressure, South Korea has agreed to invest $350 billion in the United States over the next 10 years, mostly in shipbuilding, semiconductors, and energy infrastructure. If and when these investments materialize, the volume of trade will increase. In the economic domain, the United States is the winner, although it runs a trade deficit with the ROK.

There have been some changes in the security area. After President Xi Jinping's June visit to Pyongyang, China and the DPRK agreed to pursue a strategic partnership across legal, economic, political, and military areas. Cooperation in the military area is a very unusual development, but we do not know its contents. If China gets much closer to the DPRK, South Korea will try to persuade China to adopt a more equidistant approach to diplomacy.

President Lee wants President Xi to play a mediating or facilitating role between North and South Korea. If that does not work, Seoul is likely to rely more heavily on the United States. But up to now, South Korea has been betting on the United States while dealing with China very prudently. China has been critical of Seoul's close security cooperation with Tokyo and Washington.

Although the Lee government tries to muddle through the rivalry between the two, other factors undermine China-ROK relations. They include a rather strong anti-China sentiment in South Korea, occasional clashes over historical and cultural issues, the "one China policy," and ongoing American direct and indirect pressures that undercut Beijing-Seoul bilateral relations. China has been reciprocating in kind.

PS: Looking at some of the other countries in the neighborhood, tell me about Japan and Russia. Those seem to be relationships that have also been evolving a lot in recent years. In Japan's case, there's a very difficult historical legacy that the two countries have been working on for many years—not entirely successfully. However, there has been cumulative progress.

In the case of Russia, it was really a transformative event when Russia and North Korea signed their defense pact, North Korea deployed troops to fight for Russia in Ukraine, and Russia publicly renounced UN Security Council sanctions on the North Korean government in the context of its war on Ukraine and Western sanctions on Russia. How does that all look from Seoul, and how do you think President Lee thinks about Japan and Russia, and Korea's relationships with them?

MC: Many Japanese were worried that if Lee Jae-Myung were elected, his number one target would be Japan. It is quite understandable, as he was one of the most outspoken critics of Japan and of the Japanese government's treatment of history when he was the president of the opposition party. But his attitude changed after he became president. He told the Japanese that he would honor what the previous government had committed to. He announced that he will activate a "shuttle" summit diplomacy with the Japanese counterpart. And he did. Lee also showed unusual charm in his summit talks with Japan's Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi.

President Lee visited Nara, Takaichi's home prefecture, and held a summit meeting there. They even performed in a jazz band together. He also invited her to his hometown, Andong. They had two successive summit meetings. That gave a very strong impression to the Japanese people. President Lee and Prime Minister Takaichi have built a strong personal tie through the summit. Lee Jae-myung is a very progressive politician, whereas Takaichi is a

very conservative one. It is amazing to witness that two leaders with completely different political backgrounds were able to develop some sort of chemistry through summit diplomacy.

Lee's two-track approach should have helped such development. President Lee has been arguing that we need close cooperation with Japan in security and economic areas and should not make historical issues an immediate barrier to that cooperation. However, that does not mean we should put aside the history issue.

PS: You talked earlier about President Lee's pragmatic diplomacy and his focus more on Korean interests, and much less on values than Former President Yoon. Is Lee's policy toward Japan in some way an extension of that pragmatism and a reduced emphasis on what, for many Koreans, would be an important values question?

MC: You're right, his pragmatic approach emphasizes problem-solving. He realizes the complexity and sensitivity embedded in Japan-South Korea relations. Nevertheless, he believes that he can solve the problem through mutual consultation and cooperation. If we separate security and economic issues from historical issues, and pursue them on two separate tracks, then we can minimize conflict and enhance cooperation. Making small successes in cooperative areas can facilitate the resolution of the historical past, too. That is my reading of his approach.

However, his pragmatic problem-solving approach is likely to face some daunting challenges. For example, Japan wants South Korea to reach an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA)—in other words, a military logistics cooperation agreement. But the president has made it very clear that it is too premature to discuss an ACSA with Japan, given the public sentiment in South Korea. Therefore, he is sending a very clear signal to Japan: "There are certain things which I cannot agree with you on." But in other areas, we can promote cooperation, particularly by utilizing summit diplomacy. It sounds ambivalent, but that unveils the cold reality of Japan-ROK relations.

PS: A military logistics agreement with Japan seems like it could quickly touch on Taiwan. You already mentioned US-Korea differences over a Taiwan contingency. Prime Minister Takaichi has moved closer to the United States on those questions, and China has responded accordingly. Is there a significant gap between Japan and Korea on Taiwan?

MC: Yes, there is a major gap, and it seems natural. I would call it behavior born of strategic prudence. If we are entangled in a Taiwan contingency, then we can face a greater military threat from North Korea and even China. China and North Korea could even mount joint military operations against us by treating us as a common enemy. Such development will pose major existential threats to South Korea. That's why the Lee government has been prudent in its approach to Taiwan contingency issues. National interest and strategic prudence have been guiding his approach.
Japan has a different historical and national interest context. Japan does not have a North Korean threat, and a Taiwan contingency can have immediate security implications involving the Senkaku Islands and Okinawa. Thus, it seems natural for Japan to take the side with the United States through a collective defense arrangement. But it will be hard for South Korea to

join such Japan-US actions regarding Taiwan and the South China Sea. South Korea should be more prudent, as this touches on its core national interests. This is not a matter of pro-China or pro-America, but a matter of survival.

PS: Right. I brought up Russia, too. How do you think President Lee looks at Russia?

MC: Again, as with China and North Korea, Lee wants to maintain good relations with Russia, too. But now the situation is very different. Russians used to tell us, "We are going to normalize our relations with the DPRK. Please don't try to disturb the normalization process. However, we will not pursue cooperation with the DPRK in a way that undermines South Korea's security." That was their **first** proposition.

Their **second** proposition was, "We want strong cooperation with South Korea. When the war is over, we hope that South Korean companies in Russia can restart—Samsung Electronics, Hyundai Motors, and LG Chem. We want them to return and resume their business operations in Russia. We want to maintain good relations with the Republic of Korea, too."

The **third** proposition was, "But if South Korea provides Ukraine with lethal weapons, then we will treat the Republic of Korea as an enemy country."

One of my Russian friends told me in Moscow two years ago, "Yes, the Republic of Korea is one of our so-called unfriendly nations. But among unfriendly nations, the Republic of Korea is the friendliest nation." Russians seem to believe in South Korea's strategic value for revitalizing the Russian economy after the war. Let's wait and see.
According to one research institute in South Korea, the DPRK has earned about $10 billion from Russia for the export of ammunition and manpower. There is also much deeper cooperation, as you pointed out, under the 2024 New Treaty. Moscow and Pyongyang have been engaging in extensive and intensive military exchanges and cooperation. Accordingly, we are now paying very close attention to the nature of military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK.

We are really concerned about whether Russia will transfer critical military technologies—such as ICBM-related technology (multiple warheads, reentry), hypersonic missile technology, nuclear-powered submarine technology, and satellite-related technology. If Russia begins to transfer those kinds of technologies to North Korea, that will pose a direct threat to us, and our relations with Russia can be ruined.

PS: Thank you. Last question. We haven't yet talked about one of the very big foreign policy, international security, and economic challenges out there for much of the world right now: the US and Israeli war on Iran and the disruption it has caused in global energy markets. As we're talking today, we're a couple of days after the announcement that the two sides had electronically signed a one- or one-and-a-half-page agreement—which is really more of a framework agreement—to end the fighting. President Trump has said it will be physically signed later this week [this occurred on June 18]. We don't yet know exactly what's in it because there are conflicting public reports.

But looking at that war and its global impacts, particularly on the energy and petrochemical industries, over 90 percent of Korea's energy is imported. And not just energy for transportation, but also for manufacturing, LNG for the power sector, and oil and oil products used in plastics, semiconductors, and all kinds of other things. So, we all have our fingers crossed that the conflict is behind us and the parties will work out a longer-term arrangement. What impact, if any, do you think this war has had on President Lee's foreign policy thinking? Do you expect him to make any changes?

MC: First of all, some American pundits criticize the Republic of Korea for not being supportive of President Trump's initiative in the Gulf area. But we are not alone there.

Our government's position is very similar to that of the European countries: we were never consulted. If we are going to send even minesweeping ships, the Lee Jae-myung government needs approval from our National Assembly. The government needs to explain to the members of the National Assembly the necessity of sending those ships. But without knowing what's going on there, how can the government explain it to the National Assembly? Therefore, it seems very unfair for those in Washington to criticize the Lee government for failing to support Trump's initiative in the Gulf.

An immediate impact is extensive economic damage. Inflationary pressures have been accelerating. Gasoline prices went up. South Korea is one of the largest exporters of petrochemical products in the world. Jet fuel is processed in the Republic of Korea, but the crude oil comes from the Gulf region. Because of this supply chain network, rising oil prices have a profound impact on consumer prices in South Korea. More than that, we have a very limited strategic oil stockpile. Luckily, President Trump has signed—or is about to sign—the agreement with Iran, which will relieve us of that kind of pressure.
We are an energy-dependent country. We are structurally vulnerable, and the American adventure in the Gulf really highlighted our vulnerability. Impact on security seems rather ambivalent.

Some have been asking, "After Iran, which country will be next?" Many foreign pundits said the DPRK would be next. I do not agree with it. The DPRK is not Iran. It has nuclear weapons and solid leadership, and domestic political stability. The North has the ROK, not Israel, as a neighbor. More importantly, I don't think the United States has the capabilities, intention, and political will to stage military actions against the DPRK at this present juncture. Plus, President Trump recently posted a photo online of himself with Chairman Kim Jong-un from Singapore in June 2018. That signals President Trump is willing to talk with Chairman Kim Jong-un. That's the good news.

But I think the DPRK has learned some important lessons from the American and Israeli attack on Iran. The failure of Iran's air defense system, its intelligence, and its weapon systems, which were imported from China and Russia. I think there will be a comprehensive reassessment of the North Korean defense posture. North Korea also learned the utility of drones and other short-range ballistic and cruise missiles. North Korea's defense posture could become much more sophisticated.

PS: Peace in that region is probably good news for many people. Chung-in, thank you for taking the time to have this second conversation. I think this was really fantastic, and I hope it was very helpful in explaining to our audience how President Lee views his priorities and Korea's interests. Thank you.

About the Authors: Moon Chung-in and Paul Saunders

Moon Chung-in is the James Laney professor emeritus at Yonsei University and editor-in-chief of Global Asia, a quarterly journal. He previously served as the chairman of the Sejong Institute and as a special advisor to President Moon Jae-in on unification, diplomacy, and national security affairs (2017–2021). He is also co-convener and vice chairman of the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (APLN), and Chairman of the Korea Peace Forum. Dr. Moon retired from Yonsei University in 2016, where he taught for 22 years. In the Roh Moo-hyun government, Dr. Moon served as chairman of the Presidential Committee on Northeast Asia Cooperation Initiative in 2004 and 2005, and as a member of the Presidential Advisory Commission on Defense Reform from 2004 to 2007. He was also appointed ambassador for international security affairs by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade from 2006 to 2008.

Paul J. Saunders is president of the Center for the National Interest and publisher of The National Interest*. His expertise spans US foreign and security policy; energy security and climate change; US-Russia relations and Russian foreign policy; and US relations with Japan and South Korea. Saunders is a senior advisor at the Energy Innovation Reform Project, where he served as president from 2019 to 2024. He has been a member of EIRP's board of directors since 2013 and served as chairman from 2014 to 2019. At EIRP, Saunders has focused on the collision between great-power competition and the energy transition, including issues such as energy security, energy technology competition, and climate policy in a divided world. His recent projects at EIRP have included an assessment of Russia's evolving role in the global energy system and a study of the linkages between China's energy, climate, and national security policies.*